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Abstract
This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero-
geneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of
tax revenue across social security and forward intergenerational public goods are
determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive gen-
erations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends-against-the-middle
equilibrium where low- and high-income individuals form a coalition in favor of a
low tax rate and less social security while middle-income individuals favor a high
tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social
security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with the
borrowing constraint and a low interest-rate elasticity of consumption.
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1 Introduction
Almost all OECD countries have experienced some increase in wage inequality over the
past few decades. Standard political economy theory suggests that higher wage inequal-
ity results in a larger volume of redistribution as the decisive voter becomes less well-o
as wage inequality increases (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981;
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Benabou, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). This prediction
still holds when the focus is on intergenerational redistribution, such as pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) social security. That is, the intragenerational redistribution component of the
PAYG social security system makes this program palatable to low-income young individ-
uals (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003, 2005; Bethencourt and Galasso, 2008).
The empirical evidence, however, does not necessarily support the abovementioned
theoretical predictions. OECD cross-country data show that the volume of redistribution
is negatively correlated with wage inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Chen and
Song, 2009). For instance, the United Kingdom and the United States feature higher
wage inequality and smaller redistribution whereas the Nordic countries display lower
wage inequality and larger redistribution. In fact, Pineda and Rodriguez (2006) found a
strong negative correlation between redistribution and the share of capital in GDP where
the share is considered an indicator of income inequality.
Several theories have been provided to explain the negative correlation between in-
equality and redistribution. Examples include political bias toward the rich (Benabou,
2000); the prospect of upward mobility by low-income agents (Benabou and Ok, 2001;
Arawatari and Ono, 2009); and lobbying by rich capitalists (Rodriguez, 2004). These
studies, however, abstract away forward intergenerational public goods provision (for
example, public education, environmental maintenance, pure science and other public
services for future generations) as alternative public spending and thus say nothing about
how the intergenerational conict over the composition of public spending is aected by
the increase in intragenerational inequality.
In sum, most contributions addressing the negative correlation focus on a single policy
issue. A notable exception is Levy (2005), who develops a two-dimensional political
economy model with endogenous formation of parities. In essence, Levy (2005) considers
political conicts over income redistribution that benets the poor and public education
that benets the young. One of the striking results is that higher income inequality may
decrease, rather than increase, the tax rate in the young-majority equilibrium. However,
her analysis ignores predictions about the share of redistribution and public education in
government because no provision of public education arises in equilibrium.1
1In Levy (2005), public provision of education arises only in the old-majority equilibrium. However,
inequality and redistribution have a positive correlation in that equilibrium, and this does not readily t
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The present paper contributes to this literature by predicting how the shares of so-
cial security and forward intergenerational public goods in government expenditure are
aected by inequality within a generation. For this purpose, we introduce an overlapping-
generations model with heterogeneous agents. In this economy, young workers are of three
types of income: low, middle and high. Because they are not permitted to borrow in youth
as a result of imperfect nancial markets, lower-income individuals are more likely to be
borrowing constrained. Young workers then pay a xed proportion of their labor income
to the government, and the tax revenue is divided into PAYG social security payments
from which the old can benet and public goods provision that the old cannot capture.
The tax rate and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and public
goods provision are determined in a two-dimensional majoritarian voting game played by
the young and the old. Voters cast a ballot over the labor income tax, which nances
social security and public goods provision, and over the allocation of tax revenue between
social security and public goods provision. Under this type of voting game, the existence
of a Condorcet winner of the majority voting game is not necessarily guaranteed because
of the multidimensionality of the issue space. To deal with this problem, we utilize the
concept of a structure-induced equilibrium (Shepsle, 1979) with the notion of once-and-
for-all voting, which is applied to an overlapping-generations framework by Conde-Ruiz
and Galasso (2003, 2005).
Based on the abovementioned concept of equilibrium, we consider the voting behavior
of each type of individual. The preferences of the old are identical across all types of
individuals because they owe no tax burden, receive the same level of social security
benet, and cannot capture the benet of forward intergenerational public goods. Instead,
they prefer the tax rate that attains the top of the Laer curve and full use of the revenue
for social security. In contrast, the preferences of the young depend on their income
type because the tax burden diers across the types of income. In particular, the key
factors to their preferences are the borrowing constraint and the interest-rate elasticity of
consumption.
To understand the role of these two factors, consider the case where only low-income
individuals are faced with the borrowing constraint. They wish to consume more in their
youth, but cannot because of the borrowing constraint. In this situation, a higher tax rate
produces two opposing eects: a negative eect that results in lower after-tax income,
and thus the utility loss of taxation in youth, and a positive eect that produces higher
social security benet, and thus the utility gain of taxation in old age.
When the interest-rate elasticity is high, substitution across periods is easy: the utility
loss of taxation in youth is compensated for by the utility gain of taxation in old age.
with the available empirical evidence.
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Therefore, low-income individuals choose a higher tax rate than middle- and high-income
individuals. However, when the interest-rate elasticity is low, compensation is not neces-
sarily available for low-income individuals because substitution across periods is dicult.
Low-income individuals then prefer a lower tax rate than middle-income individuals. This
results in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium where low- and high-income individuals
form a coalition in favor of a low tax rate while middle-income individuals favor a high
tax rate.
Given the characterization of political equilibrium, we investigate how the shares of
social security and forward intergenerational public goods in government expenditure are
altered in response to changes in wage inequality. We show that the mean-preserving
reduction of the decisive voter's wage creates an inverse U-shaped relationship between
the decisive voter's wage and the share of social security when the interest-rate elasticity is
low. The positive correlation arises when the decisive voter's wage is high and thus he/she
is borrowing unconstrained, while the negative correlation arises when his/her wage is low
and thus he/she is borrowing constrained. The same relation also holds between wage
inequality and the size of social security. Therefore, the interest-rate elasticity and the
borrowing constraint are the key factors needed to demonstrate the negative correlation
between wage inequality and the share (or size) of social security.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
characterizes the economic equilibrium. Section 3 develops the political system, introduces
the equilibrium concept of the voting game and demonstrates the voting behavior of each
individual. Section 4 characterizes the political equilibrium. Section 5 examines how
wage inequality aects the tax rate, the allocation of tax revenue and the levels of social
security and public goods provision via the political process. Section 6 briey undertakes
the analysis under a generalized framework. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Economic Environment
Consider a discrete time economy where time is denoted by t = 0; 1; 2    . The economy is
made up of overlapping generations of individuals, each of whom lives two periods: youth
and old age. The size of a generation born in period t, called generation t; is denoted by
Nt. Population grows at a constant rate n > 0 : Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt for all t  0: Within
each generation, there are three types of agents according to ability, low, middle and high
(j = L;M;H), whose proportions are respectively L; M and H , where
P
j 
j = 1 and
j satises the following assumption.
Assumption 1. j > n=f2(1 + n)g; j = L;M;H:
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Assumption 1 ensures that a young individual who prefers the highest tax rate among
young individuals becomes the decisive voter. To understand the argument stemming
from Assumption 1, suppose that a type-k (k = L;M or H) prefers the highest tax rate.
As explained below, all the old have the same preferences over policies and choose a higher
tax rate than any young agent. When the young and the old participate in voting, the
sum of the type-k young and the old is given by Nt
k+Nt 1, which is greater than half of
the population in period t; (Nt+Nt 1)=2; under the assumption of k > n=2(1+n). This
implies that the decisive voter becomes the old or the type-k young. However, the old
cannot become the decisive voter because the population size of the old is smaller than
that of the young under the assumption of n > 0. Therefore, the type-k young individual
becomes the decisive voter. Figure 1 provides an example of preferences over the tax rate.
[Figure 1 about here.]
2.1 Individuals
Each individual is assumed to receive utility from private consumption and publicly pro-
vided goods. The utility function of a type-j young individual in period t is given by:
U jt =
(cyjt )
1    1
1   + 
(gt)
1    1
1   +  

cojt+1 + 
(gt+1)
1    1
1  

;
where cyjt is consumption in youth, c
oj
t+1 is consumption in old age, gt is per capita public
goods in period t; (> 0) is the parameter representing the preference for public goods,
 2 (0; 1] is the discount factor and (> 0) is the inverse of the elasticity of young-age
consumption with respect to the interest rate. Following the literature (Conde-Ruiz and
Galasso, 2005; Borck, 2007; Bethencourt and Galasso, 2008), we assume a quasi-linear
utility function for analytical tractability.2
Each individual works in youth and retires in old age. The wage income is related
to working ability. The wage of a type-j individual is given by wj(j = H;M;L), where
wj is constant over time and wL < wM < wH : The average of the wage is denoted by
w  LwL + MwM + HwH :
Type-j's individual budget constraints in youth and old age are given by, respectively:
cyjt + s
j
t  (1  t)wj;
cojt+1  Rsjt + bt+1;
2In Section 6, we briey analyze the case where the utility of old-age consumption is given by
(cojt+1)
1 =(1 ). We will show that the main results are qualitatively unchanged under this alternative
assumption.
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where sjt is saving, t is the income tax rate in period t; R is the gross interest rate and
bt+1 is the per capita social security benet in old age. We impose the restriction of
nonnegative savings, that is:
sjt  0:
This rules out the possibility of borrowing in youth against future social security benets
(Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007).
We also assume that (i) the interest rate is exogenous and (ii) each individual receives
the same amount of old age social security benets regardless of contributions in their
youth. The rst assumption abstracts away the general equilibrium eect via the interest
rate investigated by, for example, Cooley and Soares (1999) and Boldrin and Rustichini
(2000). However, this simplication enables us to more simply demonstrate the analytical
solution of the model. The second assumption abstracts away from the choice of social
security systems (for example, Bismarckian vs. Beveridgean) analyzed by, for example,
Borck (2007), Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) and Cremer et al. (2007). We adopt the
second assumption to concentrate on the allocation of tax revenue over social security and
public goods provision as the main focus of the paper.
The representative type-j young individual maximizes his/her utility subject to the
budget constraints and the restriction of nonnegative saving. When sjt > 0; the rst-
order condition for an interior solution is (cyjt )
  = R and thus denes the optimal
saving decision of a type-j individual given by sjt = (1  t)wj   (R) 1=. By taking the
borrowing constraint into account, the saving function of a type-j individual is:
sjt = max

0; (1  t)wj   (R) 1=
	
: (1)
Eq. (1) indicates that the saving decision depends on the current tax rate t; but is
independent of the future tax rate t+1 and the proportion of tax revenues devoted to
social security in old age, denoted by t+1. This property comes from the assumption of
a linear utility function of old-age consumption. Because of this property, we can easily
demonstrate the joint political determination of the tax rate  and the proportion .
We should note that Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003, 2005) and Bethencourt and
Galasso (2008) cut the link between the current saving decision and future policy vari-
ables by assuming no consumption in youth; that is, households save all of their income
in their youth and consume it in their old age. In contrast, the current paper introduces
the saving decisions of households because our focus is on the borrowing constraint.
The saving function (1) implies that there is a critical rate of tax such that:
sjt ? 0, t 7 ^(wj)  1 
1
(R)1=wj
: (2)
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Figure 2 illustrates the relation between savings and the tax rate for each type of an
individual. A type-j individual chooses positive saving when the tax is below the critical
rate. However, when the tax is above the critical rate, a type-j individual faces a borrowing
constraint and can save nothing in youth. The critical rate of tax is higher when the wage
income is larger because, given a tax rate common to all types of individuals, a higher
ability individual receives a higher level of disposable income.
[Figure 2 about here.]
2.2 The Government
In each period, the government collects tax revenue from the young by imposing an income
tax. Following the convention in the literature, we present the eciency loss of taxation
by assuming convex costs of collecting taxes (see, for example, Casamatta, Cremer and
Pestieau, 2000; Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 2007; Cremer et al., 2007). The actual tax
revenue is therefore given by t(1  t)(LwL + MwM + HwH) = t(1  t) w, where the
term (1 t) is the distortionary factor. The assumption of distortionary taxation is solely
to ensure an interior solution to preferred tax rates and otherwise plays no role.
The government uses the tax revenue for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security pay-
ments along with forward intergenerational public goods such as environmental preser-
vation and pure science. The proportion t 2 [0; 1] of tax revenue is devoted to PAYG
social security benets and the remainder (1   t) is devoted to public goods provision.
The PAYG social security is then an intergenerational transfer from the young to the old
within a period. The budget constraint is tNtt(1  t) w = Nt 1bt. The per capita social
security benet in period t, bt, is given by:
bt = (1 + n)tt(1  t) w.
The formation of public goods requires investment one period ahead of time. This
assumption reects the idea that education, pure science, and investment in the envi-
ronment do not obtain immediate results. Importantly, the current young can enjoy the
outcomes of any investment in the future, while the current old cannot enjoy it while they
are still alive. The budget constraint is (1  t)Ntt(1  t) w = (Nt +Nt+1)gt+1. The per
capita pubic goods provision in period t+ 1, gt+1, is given by:
gt+1 =
1 + n
2 + n
(1  t)t(1  t) w:
2.3 The Economic Equilibrium
We dene the economic equilibrium as follows:
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Denition 1. For a given sequence of tax rates and social security shares in govern-
ment expenditure, ft; tg1t=0, an economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations,
fcyjt ; cojt ; sjtgt=0; ;1j=L;M;H with the initial condition sj0(j = L;M;H), such that: (i) in
every period a type-j individual maximizes his/her utility subject to the budget
constraints and the nonnegativity constraint of saving, (ii) the social security bud-
get and the public goods budget are balanced every period and (iii) the goods market
clears every period.
From (1) and the private and government budget constraints, the consumption func-
tions of a type-j individual in youth and old age are given by, respectively:
cyjt =
(
(R) 1= if t < ^(wj)
(1  t)wj if t  ^(wj)
cojt+1 =
(
Rf(1  t)wj   (R) 1=g+ (1 + n)t+1(1  t+1)t+1 w if t < ^(wj)
(1 + n)t+1(1  t+1)t+1 w if t  ^(wj):
Because of the assumption of a quasi-linear utility function, the consumption in youth is
type-independent and constant over time when the tax is below the critical rate.
The utility level obtained by individuals in economic equilibrium can be represented by
their indirect utility functions. We can use the above-mentioned consumption functions
to obtain an indirect utility function of a type-j young individual:
V yjt =
(
V yjt;s>0 if t < ^(w
j)
V yjt;s=0 if t  ^(wj);
(3)
where:
V y;jt;s>0 

(R) 1=
1 
  1
1   + 
h
R
n
(1  t)wj   (R) 1=
o
+ (1 + n)t+1(1  t+1)t+1 w
i
+ 
 
1+n
2+n
(1  t)(1  t)t w
1    1
1   ;
V y;jt;s=0 
((1  t)wj)1    1
1   + (1 + n)t+1(1  t+1)t+1 w
+ 
 
1+n
2+n
(1  t)(1  t)t w
1    1
1   :
V y;jt;s>0 denotes the indirect utility of a type-j young individual when he/she saves some
portion of his/her income, and V y;jt;s=0 denotes the indirect utility when he/she is faced
with a borrowing constraint and saves nothing. For each indirect utility function, the
rst term on the right-hand side shows the utility of consumption in youth, the second
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term shows the utility of consumption in old age and the third term shows the utility of
public goods in old age. Variables unrelated to political decisions are removed from the
indirect utility functions.
For a type-j old individual in period t; the indirect utility function is:
V o;jt  (1 + n)t(1  t)t w; (4)
where the right-hand side shows the PAYG social security benets. Old individuals have
the same indirect utility function regardless of their type because their saving in youth
is predetermined and the level of public goods they enjoy is predetermined one period in
advance. Therefore, old individuals have the same preferences for the tax rate,  , and the
share of PAYG social security, .
3 The Political Institution and Voting
The tax rate  and the proportion  are determined by individuals through a political
process of majoritarian voting. Elections take place every period and all individuals alive,
both young and old, cast a ballot over ; the income tax, and ; the share of social security
in government expenditure. Individual preferences over the two issues are represented by
the indirect utility functions at Eqs. (3) and (4) for the young and the old, respectively.
Every individual has zero mass, and thus no individual vote can change the outcome of
the election. We thus assume individuals vote sincerely.
This majoritarian voting game has two signicant characteristics. First, the issue
space is bidimensional ( and ), and thus the Nash equilibria of a majoritarian voting
game may fail to exist. To deal with this feature, we use the concept of issue-by-issue
voting, or structure-induced equilibrium, as formalized by Shepsle (1979) and applied by
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003, 2005) for the framework of overlapping generations.
Second, the game is intrinsically dynamic because it describes the interaction among
successive generations. To deal with the second feature, we assume full commitment, i.e.,
once-and-for-all voting. That is, voters determine the constant sequence of the parameters:
t = t+1 =  and t = t+1 =  for all t as in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000)
and Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007). We can view the full commitment solution as the
solution including intergenerational interaction because the full commitment solution can
be supported as the subgame perfect equilibrium (see, for example, Conde-Ruiz and
Galasso, 2003, 2005).
Given the stationary environment, the current model presents a static voting game.
Therefore, the result in Shepsle (1979) can be applied to obtain the sucient conditions
for the existence of a structure-induced equilibrium. In particular, if preferences are
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single peaked along every dimension of the issue space, a sucient condition for ( ; )
to be an equilibrium of the voting game with full commitment is that   represents the
outcome of majority voting over the jurisdiction  when the other dimension is xed at
its level , and vice versa. Taking second derivatives of V yjt and V
o;j
t with respect to 
and ; we immediately nd that @2V o;j=@ 2 < 0; @2V o;j=@2 < 0; @2V y;j=@ 2 < 0; and
@2V y;j=@2 < 0; showing that preferences are single peaked.
The old choose  to maximize V o;j in (4) given , and  to maximize V o;j in (4) given
 . Their preferred rate of tax and the share of PAYG social security are respectively given
by:
 oj =
1
2
and oj = 1 for all j:
Maximization is realized when the tax rate is set to attain the top of the Laer curve,
(1  ), and the maximized tax revenue is used exclusively for PAYG social security.
In what follows, we sequentially investigate the preferred tax and share of government
expenditure by the borrowing-unconstrained and borrowing-constrained young.
3.1 Voting by the Borrowing-unconstrained Young
The borrowing-unconstrained young choose  to maximize V y;js>0 in (3) given , and  to
maximize V y;js>0 in (3) given  . First, we consider the choice of  . The rst derivative of
V y;js>0 with respect to  is given by:
@V y;js>0
@
=  Rwj + (1 + n)(1  2) w
+ 

1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  2) w;
where the rst term on the right-hand side shows a marginal decrease in old-age consump-
tion, the second term shows a marginal increase in social security benets and the third
term shows a marginal utility benet of an increase in public goods provision produced
by an increase in tax revenue.
The borrowing-unconstrained young choose the  that balances marginal costs and
benets in terms of utility, that is, that attains @V y;js>0=@ = 0, which is equivalent to:
Rwj = (1 + n)(1  2) w
+ 

1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  2) w: (5)
The left-hand side of (5) is constant whereas the right-hand side of (5), denoted by RHS,
is featured by lim!0RHS = +1 and RHSj=1=2 = 0. Therefore, the preferred tax rate
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by the borrowing-unconstrained young is set within the range (0; 1=2) as illustrated in
Panel (a) of Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Next, we consider the choice of . The rst derivative of V y;js>0 with respect to  is
given by:
@V y;js>0
@
= (1 + n)(1  ) w   

1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
 1 + n
2 + n
(1  ) w;
where the rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal increase in the benet of
social security given by an increase in the share of social security, and the second term
is the marginal loss of utility of public goods given by a decrease in the share of public
goods provision. The share of PAYG social security, , is chosen to balance the marginal
benet and loss in terms of utility. However, under a certain condition, the share  could
be zero because the marginal loss of public goods in terms of utility may overcome the
marginal benet of PAYG social security at  = 0.
Based on the above argument, the preferred share of the borrowing-unconstrained
young satises @V y;js>0=@ = 0 when  > 0 and @V
y;j
s>0=@  0 when  = 0; that is:
 =
(
0 if  2 [0;  ]
1  2+n
(1+n)(1 ) w
 

2+n
1=
if  2   ; 1
2

;
(6)
where:
 
1 
q
1  4(2+n)
(1+n) w
 

2+n
1=
2
:
Panel (c) of Figure 3 illustrates the graph of (6). The range of  is limited to (0; 1=2)
because the preferred tax rate by the old is equal to 1=2 and that by the young is less than
1=2. When the tax rate is below the critical rate  , the tax revenue is too small, so that the
marginal benet of raising the share of PAYG social security is lower than the marginal
cost of reducing the share of public goods provision for any  2 [0; 1]. Therefore, the
borrowing-unconstrained young choose no expenditure to social security,  = 0; if    .
When the tax rate is above the critical rate  , the tax revenue is sucient, so that
there is a share  2 (0; 1) that balances the marginal benets and costs. The optimal
share for the borrowing-unconstrained young increases as the tax rate increases. The
optimal share attains its highest value at  = 1=2, where the tax revenue is maximized.
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3.2 Voting by the Borrowing-constrained Young
The borrowing-constrained young choose  to maximize V y;js=0 in (3) given , and  to
maximize V y;js=0 in (3) given  . First, we consider the choice of  . The rst derivative of
V y;js=0 with respect to  is:
@V y;js=0
@
=  ((1  )wj) wj + (1 + n)(1  2) w
+ 

1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  2) w;
where the rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal cost of a decrease in
disposable income in youth, the second term shows the marginal increase in social security
benets, and the third term shows the marginal utility benet of an increase in public
goods provision produced by an increase in tax revenue.
The borrowing-constrained young choose  that balances the marginal costs and ben-
ets in terms of utility. That is, they choose  that attains @V y;js=0=@ = 0, which is
equivalent to:
(wj)1 
(1  ) = (1 + n)(1  2) w
+ 

1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
 1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  2) w: (7)
Panel (b) of Figure 3 illustrates the determination of  that maximizes the utility of the
borrowing-constrained young.
Next, we consider the choice of . The rst derivative of V y;js=0 with respect to  is
given by:
@V y;js=0
@
= (1 + n)(1  ) w
  

1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
 1 + n
2 + n
(1  ) w;
which is equivalent to that of the young without borrowing constraints: @V y;js=0=@ =
@V y;js>0=@. This equality stems from the quasi-linear utility function. An increase in the
share  creates a marginal utility benet irrespective of whether the borrowing constraint
is binding. Therefore, the preferred share of the borrowing-constrained young is given by:
 =
(
0 if  2 [0;  ]
1  2+n
(1+n)(1 ) w
 

2+n
1=
if  2   ; 1
2

;
(8)
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which is equivalent to that of the borrowing-unconstrained young.3
4 The Political Equilibrium
The previous section analyzed the voting behavior of each type of individual along the
two dimensions of the issue space,  and . Given that preferences are single peaked
for each issue, we can now apply Shepsle's (1979) result and characterize the structure-
induced equilibrium of the game. To proceed with the analysis, we impose the following
assumption.
Assumption 2: 1 > 4(2+n)
(1+n) w
 

2+n
1=
.
This assumption implies that the preferred share in (6) and (8), which attains the
highest value at  = 1=2; takes a positive value at  = 1=2. Therefore, the assumption
ensures that a political equilibrium exists with  > 0 for a certain range of  ; otherwise,
 = 0 holds for any  2 [0; 1]; implying a trivial outcome of no provision of PAYG social
security.
The structure-induced equilibrium outcome is found as follows. First, we determine
the decisive voter over  and calculate his/her most preferred share, denoted by dec(),
as a function of the tax rate  , where the superscript dec indicates the decisive voter.
Second, we determine the decisive voter over  and calculate his/her most preferred tax
rate, denoted by  dec(), as a function of the share parameter . Finally, we nd the
point where these reaction functions dec() and  dec() cross. This point corresponds to
the structure-induced equilibrium outcome of the voting game.
First, consider the political determination of . The decisive voter over  is a young
individual because (i) the population size of the young is larger than that of the old and
(ii) all young individuals have the same preferences for  regardless of their type, as shown
in (6) and (8). Therefore, from (6) and (8), the decisive voter's reaction function dec()
is given by:
dec() =
(
0 if  2 [0;  ]
1  2+n
(1+n)(1 ) w
 

2+n
1=
if  2   ; 1
2

:
(9)
Next, consider the political determination of  . The decisive voter over  belongs to
the young generation because (i) young individuals choose lower tax rates than the old
and (ii) the population size of the young is larger than that of the old. In particular, to
determine the type of the decisive voter, we focus on the parameter  representing the
inverse of the interest-rate elasticity of young-age consumption and consider two cases
3The equivalence stems from the assumption of a quasi-linear utility function of old-age consumption.
In Section 6, we show how the preferences over  change when this assumption is removed.
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separately: a high elasticity (1=  1 in Subsection 4.1) and a low elasticity (1= < 1 in
Subsection 4.2).
We adopt the above classication because the order of preferences for the tax rate
critically depends on the degree of interest-rate elasticity. For the case of 1=  1, a
lower-income young individual prefers a higher tax rate. However, for the case of 1= < 1,
a low-income young individual may prefer a lower tax rate than middle-income (or middle-
and high-income) individuals. For each case, we show the existence and uniqueness of a
structure-induced equilibrium of the voting game and explain the mechanism underlying
the result.
4.1 The Case of a High Interest-rate Elasticity of Consumption
(1=  1)
To determine the type of a decisive voter over  in the case of 1=  1, we consider the
preferred tax rate of a type-j young in the following way. When  < ^(wj), he/she saves
part of his/her income, and his/her preference for  follows (5). When   ^(wj), he/she
saves nothing and his/her preference over  follows (7). From (5) and (7), given , the
preferred tax rate by the type-j young satises the following condition:
(1 + n)(1  2) w + 

1 + n
2 + n
(1  ) w
1 
1  2
((1  ))| {z }
LHS
=
(
Rwj if  < ^(wj)
(wj)1 
(1 ) if   ^(wj);| {z }
RHSj
(10)
where LHS and RHSj show marginal benet and loss of taxation in terms of utility,
respectively.
Figure 4 illustrates the condition (10) that determines the preferred tax rate by a
type-j young (j = L;M;H) individual. The left-hand side of (10), denoted by LHS,
is decreasing in  and is independent of the type of young individual. In contrast, the
right-hand side of (10), denoted by RHSj, is nondecreasing in  , and dependent on the
type of young individual and featured by RHSH  RHSM  RHSL, where an equality
holds if and only if  = 1. The kink point of  = ^(wj) implies that a type-j young can
save part of his/her income if  < ^(wj) and nothing if   ^(wj). It is immediately
obvious from Figure 4 that given , a lower-income young individual prefers a higher tax
rate:  yH <  yM <  yL for all  2 [0; 1], where  yj(j = L;M;H) denotes the preferred
tax rate of a type-j young individual.
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[Figure 4 about here.]
Given the assumption of demographic structure (Assumption 1) and the fact  yH <
 yM <  yL <  oj, the decisive voter over  is the one who prefers the highest tax rate
among young individuals, that is, a type-L young individual. Therefore, the reaction
function of ;  dec(); is implicitly given by (10) with j = L: To nd the crossing point of
the two reaction functions, dec() and  dec(); we substitute (9) into (10) with j = L to
obtain:
y( ; w; n) = z( ;wL);
where:
y( ; w; n) =
(
(1 + )

1+n
2+n
w
	1  1 2
((1 )) if   
(1 + n)(1  2) w if  > 
z( ;wL) =
(
RwL if  < ^(wL)
(wL)1 
(1 ) if   ^(wL):
Solving y( ; w; n) = z( ;wL) for  leads to the tax rate in a structure-induced equilibrium
of the voting game. The corresponding  is obtained by substituting the equilibrium 
into the reaction function dec in (9).
Proposition 1. Suppose that 1=  1 holds. There exists a unique structure-induced
equilibrium of the voting game such that the decisive voter over  is a type-L young
individual.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
Figure 5 illustrates two examples. Panel (a) depicts the case where the wage of type-
L individuals is high such that they can save part of their income in youth for future
consumption. In this case, the equilibrium tax rate represented by the crossing point of
y( ; w; n) and z( ;wL) is below the critical rate of ^(wL). In contrast, panel (b) illustrates
the case where the wage of type-L individuals is low such that they save nothing in their
youth. The equilibrium tax rate is given above the critical rate of ^(wL).
[Figure 5 about here.]
4.2 The Case of a Low Interest-rate Elasticity of Consumption
(1= < 1)
Next, consider the case of a low interest-rate elasticity such that 1= < 1. The decisive
voter over  is equivalent to that in the previous case: that is, the reaction function
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dec() is given by (9). However, the decisive voter over  may dier from the previous
case: that is, the order of preferred tax rates may change depending on the value of .
To determine the decisive voter over  , let us recall the condition (10) that determines
the tax rate preferred by a type-j young individual for a given . The graphs of (10) for
j = L;M;H are illustrated in Figure 6. The main dierence from the previous case is
that RHSi and RHSj(i 6= j) cross at some tax rate  2 (0; 1=2). This is because when
a type-j individual is borrowing constrained, the slope of RHSj becomes steeper as the
elasticity 1= becomes lower. Thus, there are two critical values of  , ~LM and ~MH , such
that RHSL and RHSH cross at  = ~LM and RHSM and RHSH cross at  = ~MH . By
direct calculation, we obtain:
~LM  1 

(wL)1 
RwM
1=
and ~MH  1 

(wM)1 
RwH
1=
;
where ^(wL) < ~LM < ^(wM) < ~LM < ^(wH) (see Figure 6). The derivation of ~LM and
~MH is given in Appendix 8.2.
[Figure 6 about here.]
The tax rate preferred by a type-j young is determined by the crossing point of
LHS and RHS of (10). RHS is independent of  while LHS is strictly increasing
in . Thus, the tax rate preferred by a type-j young depends on the size of . Overall,
he/she prefers a higher tax rate when  is higher.
The order of tax rates preferred by the three types of agents is changed by the size of 
as illustrated in Figure 6. First, when  is low such that LHS of (10) crosses RHS of (10)
with j = L within the range (0; ~LM ], the tax rates preferred by the young are ordered
by  yH <  yM <  yL, where  yj(j = L;M;H) denotes the preferred tax rate by type-j
young: the type-L young individual becomes the decisive voter. Second, when  attains
a middle value such that LHS of (10) crosses RHS of (10) with j = M within the range
(~LM ; ~MH ], the tax rates preferred by the young are ordered by  yH <  yL <  yM or
 yL   yH <  yM : the decisive voter in this case is the type-M young individual. Finally,
when  is high such that LHS of (10) crosses RHS of (10) with j = H within the range
[~MH ; 1=2], the tax rates preferred by the young are ordered by  yL <  yM <  yH : the
decisive voter becomes the type-H young individual.
Given the abovementioned feature, the reaction function of  ,  =  dec(), is now
implicitly given by:
(1+n)(1 2) w+(1+)

1 + n
2 + n
(1  ) w
1 
 1  2
((1  )) = ~z( ;w
L; wM ; wH); (11)
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where:
~z( ;wL; wM ; wH) 
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
RwL if  < ^(wL)
(wL)1 
(1 ) if ^(w
L)    ~LM
RwM if ~LM <  < ^(wM)
(wM )1 
(1 ) if ^(w
M)    ~MH
RwH if ~MH <  < ^(wH)
(wH)1 
(1 ) if ^(w
H)   < 1
2
:
The graph of the function ~z is illustrated by the bold curve in Figure 6.
We substitute the reaction function of dec() given by (9) into the left-hand side of
(11) to obtain the condition that determines the equilibrium tax rate:
y( ; w; n) = ~z( ;wL; wM ; wH):
Figure 7 illustrates the graphs of y( ; w; n) and ~z( ;wL; wM ; wH). Solving y( ; w; n) =
~z( ;wL; wM ; wH) for  leads to the tax rate in a structure-induced equilibrium of the
voting game. The corresponding  is obtained by substituting the equilibrium  into the
reaction function dec in (9).
[Figure 7 about here.]
Proposition 2. Suppose that 1= < 1 holds. There exists a unique structure-induced
equilibrium of the voting game such that the decisive voter over  is:
(i) a type-L individual if y(~LM ; w)  RwM ;
(ii) a type-M individual if RwM < y(~LM ; w) and y(~MH ; w)  RwH ; and
(iii) a type-H individual if RwH < y(~MH ; w).
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
A noteworthy feature of the result in Proposition 2 is that under certain conditions,
the middle-income (or middle- and high-income) individuals prefer a higher tax rate than
the low-income individuals. In particular, if the condition in statement (ii) in Proposition
2 holds, there exists an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium where the low- and high-
income young individuals form a coalition in favor of a low tax rate and the middle-income
individual favoring a high tax rate becomes the decisive voter (see Figure 7). In contrast,
if the condition in statement (iii) holds, the low- and middle-income individuals form a
coalition and the high-income young individual becomes the decisive voter.
The key factors in the result in Proposition 2 are the borrowing constraints and the
interest-rate elasticity of consumption. To understand the roles of these two factors,
17
consider where the low-income individuals are faced with a borrowing constraint. Here,
they wish to consume more in their youth, but cannot because of the borrowing constraint.
In this situation, a higher tax rate produces two opposing eects: a negative eect that
results in lower after-tax income and thus the utility loss of taxation in youth, and a
positive eect that produces higher social security benet and thus the utility gain in old
age.
The net impact of taxation depends on the interest-rate elasticity. When the elasticity
is high such that 1= > 1, the positive eect overcomes the negative eect. The low-
income individual then chooses the highest tax rate among the young and thus becomes
the decisive voter. When 1= = 1; both eects perfectly cancel out. The three types of
young then choose the same tax rate. Finally, when the elasticity is low such that 1= < 1,
the negative eect may dominate the positive eect. In particular, if RwM < y(~LM ; w)
and y(~MH ; w)  RwH hold as in Proposition 2(ii), the negative eect dominates the
positive eect for low-income individuals. They choose a lower tax rate than the middle-
income individuals, and this results in an equilibrium where the middle-income individual
is the decisive voter.
5 Eects of Income Inequality on Policy
Given the characterization of the political equilibrium in Section 4, we wish to investigate
how the tax rate (), the share of social security (), the level of social security benet
(b) and public goods provision (g) change in response to changes in income inequality. In
particular, we consider a mean-preserving reduction of the decisive voters' wage in order
to compare two groups of countries with similar per capita income levels but dierent
levels of income inequality. We focus on the nontrivial equilibrium with  > 0 to observe
the marginal eect on the share of social security in government expenditure.
Proposition 3. Consider a political equilibrium with  > 0.
(i) In an economy with 1=  1 where the decisive voter is a type-L young individual,
a mean-preserving reduction of wL increases the tax rate ( ), the share of social
security () and the level of social security benet ( b), and keeps the level of public
goods ( g) constant.
(ii) In an economy with 1= < 1 where the decisive voter is a type-j ( j = L;M;H)
young individual, a mean-preserving change in the decisive voter's wage (wj) locally
produces inverse U-shaped relationships between wj and the tax rate ( ), between wj
and the share of social security (), and between wj and the level of social security
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benet ( b) if the equilibrium tax rate is initially given by  equil = ^(wj); and keeps
the level of public goods ( g) constant.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
Proposition 3 states that if the interest-rate elasticity is high such that 1=  1, there
is a monotone relationship between the decisive voter's wage and his/her preferred tax
rate. The decisive voter then prefers a higher tax rate as he/she becomes poorer. However,
when the elasticity is low such that 1= < 1, such a monotone relationship no longer holds.
Once the decisive voter's wage falls below the critical level that changes his/her status
from unconstrained to constrained, he/she prefers a lower tax rate as he/she becomes
poorer. There is then an inverse U-shaped relationship between the decisive voter's wage
and the preferred tax rate around the critical wage.
To understand the result intuitively, let us assume that the decisive voter is a type-
L individual regardless of the value of , and consider cases where the decisive voter
is borrowing unconstrained and constrained, respectively. The following argument also
holds for the case of 1= < 1 where the decisive voter is a type-M or type-H individual.
Figure 8 illustrates the eects of a mean-preserving change in the decisive voter's wage
on the equilibrium tax rate. Panel (a) is for the case of 1=  1; Panel (b) is for the case
of 1= < 1.
[Figure 8 about here.]
To proceed with the analysis, we rst assume that the decisive voter is borrowing
unconstrained: sL > 0. Given a tax rate  , a reduction of wL decreases the after-tax
income of the decisive voter in youth, but has no eect on the consumption in youth
because cyj = (R) 1= if sL > 0. The negative income eect is then absorbed by saving
because of the assumption of a quasi-linear utility function. In other words, a reduction of
wL only has an eect on consumption in old age. The decisive voter then wishes to oset
the loss of saving by increasing the PAYG social security benets. Therefore, a mean-
preserving reduction of the decisive voter's wage gives him/her an incentive to choose a
higher tax rate when he/she is borrowing unconstrained.
Next, suppose that the decisive voter is borrowing constrained: sL = 0: the equilibrium
tax rate satises y( ; w; n) = (wL)1 =(1  ), where the right-hand side is the marginal
utility loss of taxation when the decisive voter is borrowing constrained. A marginal
reduction of wL aects the marginal utility loss of taxation such that @(wL)1 =(1  
)=@wL = (1   )(wL) =(1   ) ? 0 , 1= ? 1. When 1=  1; a reduction of
wL leads to a decrease in the marginal utility loss, thereby giving the decisive voter an
incentive to increase the tax rate. However, when 1= < 1 holds, a reduction of wL
leads to the opposite eect. Therefore, if 1= < 1, a mean-preserving reduction of the
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decisive voter's wage gives him/her an incentive to choose a lower tax rate when he/she
is borrowing constrained.
The share of social security () changes in the same direction as  because the decisive
voter's reaction function dec(), given by (9), is increasing in  as long as  2 (0; 1=2).
The social security benet (b) also changes in the same direction as  because b is given by
b = (1+n)(1  ) from the government budget constraint. However, the level of public
goods (g), given by g = (1 + n)(1  )(1  ) w=(2 + n), remains unchanged because an
increase (decrease) in the tax revenue, (1  ) w, is oset by a decrease (increase) in the
share of public goods provision, (1  ).
The result established in Proposition 3 implies that an economy with a low interest-rate
elasticity (i.e., the case of 1= < 1) exhibits an inverse U-shaped relationship between
the decisive voter's wage and the level of social security, as illustrated in Panel (c) of
Figure 8. When the decisive voter (i.e., a type-L individual in the current assumption) is
borrowing unconstrained, a lower wL results in a higher tax rate, a higher share of social
security and thus a higher level of social security benet. However, when the decisive
voter is borrowing constrained, a lower wL results in a lower tax rate, a lower share of
social security and thus a lower level of social security benet.
Empirical Implications
As mentioned in Section 1, standard political economy theory suggests a positive
correlation between inequality and social security: higher inequality results in greater
redistribution. However, cross-country data do not necessarily support this prediction.
For example, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and Chen and Song (2009) nd a negative
correlation between wage inequality and social security: put dierently, countries with
smaller earnings inequality have, on average, greater social security as a percentage of
GDP. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States feature high income
inequality, a low tax rate and a low level of social security benets. In contrast, many
continental European and Nordic countries feature low income inequality, a high tax rate
and a high level of social security benets.
In the current framework, the negative correlation arises only in the equilibrium where
the following two conditions hold: (i) the interest-rate elasticity of consumption is low
and (ii) the decisive voter is borrowing constrained. When one of the conditions fails to
hold, the economy displays a positive correlation between income inequality and the tax
rate. This is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. Therefore, our analysis suggests
that these factors are the key to explaining cross-country dierences in income inequality,
tax rates and the share of social security.
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6 A Generalized Utility Function
To this point, we have conducted the analysis by assuming a quasi-linear utility function
where the utility of old-age consumption is given by cojt+1. This specication enables us
to illustratively show the existence and uniqueness of the political equilibrium. However,
the specication also results in (i) a saving decision unaected by social security; and (ii)
type-independent preferences over the share of social security. We introduce a nonlinear
utility function of old-age consumption to resolve these problems. We show that most of
the previous results still hold true under this alternative utility function. That is, under
a certain condition, there exists the same ends-against-the-middle equilibrium when the
interest-rate elasticity is low and the decisive voter is borrowing constrained. In this
equilibrium, a mean-preserving spread of income inequality results in a lower equilibrium
tax rate and a lower share of social security in government expenditure.
For the purpose of analysis, we assume the following utility function:
U jt =
(cyjt )
1    1
1   + 
(gt)
1    1
1   + 
"
(cojt+1)
1    1
1   + 
(gt+1)
1    1
1  
#
:
The main dierence from the previous model is that the utility of old-age consumption is
given by f(cojt+1)1    1g=(1   ). We maximize their lifetime utility under the budget
constraints and obtain the following saving function:
sjt = max

0;
(R)1=
(R)1= +R

(1  t)wj   bt+1
(R)1=

:
Saving now depends on the social security benet bt+1 that gives agents a disincentive
to save. We hereafter drop the time subscript because our focus is on the time-invariant
policy.
We substitute the government budget constraint for social security b = (1+ n)(1 
) w into the above saving function to obtain the following condition that determines the
saving behavior of a type-j individual:
sj > 0, w
j
w
 (R)
1=
1 + n
>  .
This inequality condition states that a type-j individual is borrowing unconstrained if
his/her wage is high, the tax burden is low, and/or the share of social security in govern-
ment expenditure is also low.
With the saving function and the government budget constraints, we give the con-
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sumption functions of a type-j individual in youth and old age as follows:
cyjt =
8<: R(R)1=+R
h
(1  )wj + (1+n)(1 ) w
R
i
if w
wj
 (R)1=
1+n
> 
(1  )wj if wj
w
 (R)1=
1+n
 
cojt+1 =
8<:
(R)1=R
(R)1=+R
h
(1  )wj + (1+n)(1 ) w
R
i
if w
j
w
 (R)1=
1+n
> 
(1 + n)(1  ) w if wj
w
 (R)1=
1+n
 :
Unlike the previous case, the consumption in youth is now type-dependent and is linearly
related to lifetime income when agents are borrowing unconstrained.
After some calculation, we can obtain indirect utility functions of type-j young and
old individuals as follows:
V yj =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
V y;js>0  1 
h
(1  )wj + (1+n)(1 ) w
R
i1 
+ 
1 

1+n
2+n
(1  )(1  ) w1 
if w
j
w
 (R)1=
1+n
> 
V y;js=0  (
(1 )wj)1 
1  +

1  [(1 + n)(1  ) w]1  + 1 

1+n
2+n
(1  )(1  ) w1 
if w
j
w
 (R)1=
1+n
 
V oj =
(
V y;js>0  11 

Rsj 1 + (1 + n)(1  ) w
1 
if w
j
w
 (R)1=
1+n
> 
V y;js=0  1 

1+n
2+n
(1  )(1  ) w1  if wj
w
 (R)1=
1+n
 ;
where variables unrelated to political decisions are dropped from V yj and V oj.
The policy preferences of the old are the same as for quasi-linear utility. That is,
regardless of type and saving behavior, the old wish to maximize the tax revenue from
the young and use it exclusively for social security:  oj = 1=2 and oj = 1 hold for all j:
Accordingly, generalization of the utility function does not aect the policy preferences
of the old.
We next consider the policy preferences of the young. The preferred tax rate of a
type-j young individual satises the following rst-order condition with respect to  :
LHSy = RHSyj 
(
RHSyjs>0 if  < 
(wj; )  wj
w
 (R)1=
1+n
 1

RHSyjs=0 if    (wj; ) ;
(12)
where:
LHSy  

1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
 1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  2) w;
RHSyjs>0  

(1  )wj + (1 + n)(1  ) w
R
 


wj   (1 + n)(1  2) w
R

; and
RHSyjs=0  (1  ) 
 
wj
1     [(1 + n)(1  ) w]  (1 + n)(1  2) w:
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LHSy represents the marginal benet of taxation in terms of the utility of public
goods. This benet is common to the three types of young agents because of the nature
of public goods. RHSyj represents the marginal loss of taxation plus the marginal benet
of social security in terms of the utility of consumption. However, the sum of these
losses and benets diers across agents. In particular, the following properties hold (see
Appendix 8.5 for the proof):(
RHSyL < RHSyM < RHSyH if 1=  1
RHSyLs=0 > RHS
yM
s=0 > RHS
yH
s=0 if 1= < 1:
(13)
Similar to the previous model, the order of RHSyjs=0(j = L;M;H) critically depends on
the degree of interest-rate elasticity 1=.4
Panel (a) of Figure 9 illustrates the graph of (12) when 1=  1 holds. The crossing
point of LHSy and RHSyj determines the tax rate preferred by a type-j young agent. The
gure shows that a lower-income young individual prefers a higher tax rate. Under the
demographic structure assumption given in Assumption 1, a type-L young agent becomes
the decisive voter over  . That is, the-ends-against-the-middle equilibrium never arises
when the interest-rate elasticity is high such that 1=  1.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Panel (b) of Figure 9 illustrates the graph of (12) when 1= < 1 holds. A noteworthy
feature is that lower-income young prefer a lower tax rate when agents are borrowing
constrained. In particular, there may arise an equilibrium where the low- and the high-
income young agents form a coalition against the middle, as illustrated in Panel (b) of
Figure 9. Therefore, the low interest-rate elasticity and the borrowing constraint remain
the key to the existence of the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium.
The political determination of the share of social security  is slightly dierent from
that in the previous quasi-linear utility case. The preferred share of a type-j young is
given by:
yj =
8>><>>:
0 if   ~(wj)
1=(2+n) (R=(2+n))1=(wj= w(1+n))
1=(2+n)+(R=(2+n))1==R
if ~(wj) <  < ^(wj)
1=(2+n)
1=(2+n)+(=(2+n))1=
if ^(wj)  
(14)
4If 1= < 1, the order of RHSyjs>0(j = L;M;H) is ambiguous.
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where
~(wj) 

R
(2 + n)
1=
 w
j(2 + n)
w(1 + n)
;
^(wj)  w
j(2 + n)
w(1 + n)
(R)1=
(
1
2 + n
+


2 + n
1=)
:
The rst two lines of the right-hand side in (14) represent the choice of  when a type-j
young is borrowing unconstrained; the third line represents the choice of  when he/she
is borrowing constrained. The derivation of (14) is given in Appendix 8.5.
When the tax burden is low, such that   ~(wj), a type-j young individual can save
much for his/her old-age consumption and thus nds it unnecessary to use tax revenue for
social security:  = 0. However, when the tax is above ~(wj), a type-j young individual
nds it optimal to oset part of their tax-induced consumption loss with a social security
benet. In particular, a lower income agent prefers a higher share of social security.
A type-j young individual is borrowing constrained when the tax rate is high such
that   ^(wj). Borrowing-constrained agents choose the same share of social security
regardless of their type. This is because they have the same level of old-age consumption
that is equal to the lump-sum pension benet. They then choose that share to equate
the marginal utilities of old-age consumption and public goods, both of which are type-
independent.
Panel (c) of Figure 9 illustrates the reaction function of  for each type of an agent.
The gure shows that yH()  yM()  yL() < o holds for any  . Thus, under
the demographic structure in Assumption 1, a type-L young agent becomes the decisive
voter. We can derive the political equilibrium tax rate by substituting  = yL into the
decisive voter's rst-order condition with respect to  .
Given a brief characterization of the political equilibrium, we now compare the income
inequality eects between the current and former models. In particular, we focus on the
situation where the decisive voters over  and  are borrowing constrained. Thus, the
decisive voter's choice of  in the current framework is given by:
dec =
1
1 + (2 + n)( 1)= ()1=
;
which is independent of  . We substitute this into (12) for the case of    (wj; ) and
obtain the following condition that determines the equilibrium tax rate when the decisive
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voter is borrowing constrained:


1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w
 
1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  2) w
= (1  )   wj1     [(1 + n)(1  ) w]  (1 + n)(1  2) w;
where  is now constant. Given  , the left-hand side is independent of wj whereas the
right-hand side is decreasing (increasing) in wj if 1= < (>)1. Thus, a mean-preserving
reduction of the decisive voter's wage decreases (increases) the equilibrium tax rate if the
interest-rate elasticity is low (high) such that 1= < (>)1. This result is qualitatively
equivalent to that in the quasi-linear utility function model.
The corresponding levels of social security and public goods are given by b = (1 +
n)(1  ) w and g = ((1 + n)=(2 + n))(1  )(1  ) w. Because  is unchanged while
 is decreased (increased) by the mean-preserving reduction of wj if 1= < (>)1, b and g
are decreased (increased) if the interest-rate elasticity is low (high) such that 1= < (>)1.
The main departure from the result in the previous model is that public goods provision
is now nonneutral with respect to the mean-preserving expansion of income inequality.
7 Conclusion
Why is wage inequality negatively correlated with the level of social security? How does
wage inequality aect the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward
intergenerational public goods provision? This paper develops a political economy model
that responds to both these important questions.
Two features are crucial to our analysis and results: the interest-rate elasticity of
consumption and the borrowing constraint. These features derive an ends-against-the-
middle equilibrium where low- and high-income individuals form a coalition in favor of
a low tax rate and middle-income individuals favor a high tax rate. In addition, higher
wage inequality results in a lower level of social security and a lower share of social
security in government expenditure when the decisive voter is borrowing constrained and
the interest-rate elasticity is low.
The negative correlation between inequality and social security we obtain appears to t
the available empirical evidence. This correlation arises only in the equilibrium where the
abovementioned conditions are eective for the decisive voter. When one of the conditions
fails to hold, the economy displays a positive, rather than negative, correlation between
inequality and social security. Thus, our analysis suggests that the two conditions play a
key role in explaining cross-country dierences in inequality and social security.
To obtain these results, we simplify the analysis by adopting a quasi-linear utility
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function. Because of this simplication, we can remove the link between saving and the
allocation of tax revenue between social security and public goods provision. However,
and as shown in our analysis, the eect of the interest-rate elasticity of consumption on
the political determination of the tax rate and the allocation of tax revenue remains. In
addition, Section 6 demonstrates that the main results are qualitatively unchanged under
a generalized utility function except for the level of public goods. Thus, our analysis is
almost robust to the assumption of a quasi-linear utility function.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As shown in the text, when 1=  1, the decisive voter is a type-L individual and his/her
preferred tax rate satises y( ; w; n) = z( ;wL). The functions y( ; w; n) and z( ;wL)
have the following properties: @y( ; w; n)=@ < 0; lim!1 y( ; w; n) = 1; y(1=2; w; n) =
0; @z( ;wL)=@  0; z(0;wL) = maxfRwL; (wL)1 g < 1; and z(1=2;wL) 2 (0;1).
These properties indicate that there exists a unique  2 (0; 1=2) that satises y( ; w; n) =
z( ;wL). 
8.2 The derivation of ~LM and ~MH
The derivation of ~LM is as follows. For the range of (^(wL); ^(wM)), the right-hand side
of (10), denoted by RHSj, is given by:
RHSj =
(
RHSL = (wL)1 =(1  ) for j = L
RHSM = RwM for j = M:
RHSL < RHSM holds at  = ^(wL); RHSL > RHSM holds at  = ^(wM). Thus, there
exists a unique  , denoted by ~LM 2 (^(wL); ^(wM)), that satises RHSL = RHSM
because RHSL is continuous and strictly increasing in  whereas RHSM is independent
of  . We can derive ~LM by solving (wL)1 =(1  ) = RwM for  .
By the same token, the tax rate that satises RHSM = RHSH for the range of
(^(wM); ^(wH)) is derived by solving (wM)1 =(1   ) = RwH for  . The solution is
denoted by ~MH .
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
As shown in the text, when 1= < 1, the decisive voter's preferred tax rate satises
y( ; w; n) = ~z( ;wL; wM ; wH). The functions y( ; w; n) and ~z( ;wL; wM ; wH) have the
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following properties:
@y( ; w; n)=@ < 0;
lim
!1
y( ; w; n) =1;
y(1=2; w; n) = 0;
@~z( ;wL; wM ; wH)=@  0;
~z(0;wL; wM ; wH) = maxfRwL; (wL)1 g <1;
~z(1=2;wL; wM ; wH) 2 (0;1):
These properties indicate that there exists a unique  2 (0; 1=2) satisfying y( ; w; n) =
~z( ;wL; wM ; wH). The condition for the determination of the decisive voter over  can
be found from Figure 7. 
8.4 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) For the case of 1=  1, the decisive voter is a type-L young individual and the
equilibrium tax rate satises y( ; w; n) = z( ;wL) as shown in Subsection 4.1. When
the mean-preserving change in wL is considered, y( ; w; n) is unchanged while z( ;wL) is
decreased by a reduction of wL. Therefore, a mean-preserving reduction of wL results in
an increase in the equilibrium tax rate that satises y( ; w; n) = z( ;wL). Given dec()
is increasing in  for  2 (0; 1=2), a mean-preserving decrease in wL results in an increase
in .
From the government budget constraints for social security (b) and public goods pro-
vision (g) in Subsection 2.2, b and g are given by:
b = (1 + n)(1  ) w; (15)
g =
1 + n
2 + n
(1  )(1  ) w =

(1 + )
(2 + n)
1=
; (16)
where the second equality in the equation (16) is obtained by substituting the decisive
voter's reaction function dec() in (9) into the equation. (15) and (16) imply that b is
increased by an increase in  and , thereby implying a negative eect of wL on b; and g
is independent of  and , thereby implying no eect of wL.
(ii) For the case of 1= < 1, the decisive voter in this case is a type-j (j = L;M or H)
individual depending on parameter values as shown in Subsection 4.2. To simplify the
presentation, suppose that a type-L individual is a decisive voter. Note that the following
argument applies for the case where a type-j (j = M or H) is a decisive voter.
Assume that the equilibrium tax rate is given by  equil = ^(wL): a type-L individual
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is indierent between saving and not saving. Under this situation, the decisive voter's
wage wL satises (1 + n)(1  2^(wL)) w = RwL, or:
R(wL)2 + (1 + n) wwL   2(1 + n) w
(R)1=
= 0:
Solving this equation for wL, we obtain:
wL = w^L   (1 + n) w +
p
f(1 + n) wg2 + 8R(1 + n) w=(R)1=
2R
:
Therefore, the equilibrium tax rate is given by  equil = ^(wL) when a type-L individual
with wL = w^L is a decisive voter.
Let us consider a mean-preserving change of wL around w^L. As shown in Subsection
4.2, the equilibrium tax rate satises y( ; w; n) = ~z( ;wL; wM ; wH) if 1= < 1. In par-
ticular, around wL = w^L, there exists a positive real number " such that the equilibrium
tax rate satises the following condition:
~z( ;wL; wM ; wH) =
(
RwL for wL 2 (w^L   "; w^L];
(wL)1 
(1 ) for w
L 2 [w^L; w^L + "):
We focus on the range (w^L   "; w^L + ") and consider a mean-preserving change of
wL around w^L. The right-hand side of the above equation is increasing in wL within the
range (w^L   "; w^L) and decreasing in wL within the range (w^L; w^L + "): This property
implies that the equilibrium tax rate attains the highest value at wL = w^L within the
range (w^L   "; w^L + "). Therefore, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the
decisive voters' wage and the equilibrium tax rate around wL = w^L. Given dec() is
increasing in  for  2 (0; 1=2), there is also an inverse U-shaped relationship between the
decisive voters' wage and the equilibrium share of social security around wL = w^L. Given
the result for  and , the result for b and g arises from (15) and (16). 
8.5 Supplementary Explanation for Section 6
8.5.1 Derivation of (13)
In order to establish that (13) holds, we focus on the relationship between RHSyL
and RHSyM . The result immediately applies to the relationship between RHSyM and
RHSyH .
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Let us rst compare RHSyLs>0 and RHS
yM
s>0. We obtain:
RHSyLs>0 7 RHSyMs>0
,

(1  )wL + (1 + n)(1  ) w
R
 


wL   (1 + n)(1  2) w
R

7

(1  )wM + (1 + n)(1  ) w
R
 


wM   (1 + n)(1  2) w
R

, w
L   (1 + n)(1  2) w=R
wM   (1 + n)(1  2) w=R 7
"
(1  )wL + (1+n)(1 ) w
R
(1  )wM + (1+n)(1 ) w
R
#
: (17)
The left-hand side of (17) is smaller than wL=wM whereas the the term in the large
parentheses on the right-hand side is larger than wL=wM ; that is:
wL   (1 + n)(1  2) w=R
wM   (1 + n)(1  2) w=R <
wL
wM
;
wL
wM
=
(1  )wL
(1  )wM <
(1  )wL + (1+n)(1 ) w
R
(1  )wM + (1+n)(1 ) w
R
:
Therefore, we have:
RHSyLs>0 < RHS
yM
s>0 if
wL
wM


wL
wM

,

wL
wM
1 
 1. (18)
(18) indicates that RHSyLs>0 < RHS
yM
s>0 holds if   1, i.e., if 1=  1.
We next compare RHSyLs=0 and RHS
yM
s=0. Direct comparison leads to:
RHSyLs=0 7 RHSyMs=0 ,
 
wL
1  7  wM1  :
Therefore, we can conclude:
RHSyLs=0  RHSyMs=0 if   1, 1=  1;
RHSyLs=0 > RHS
yM
s=0 if  > 1, 1= < 1:
8.5.2 Derivation of (14)
Suppose rst that the type-j young agent is borrowing unconstrained. The rst-order
condition for the maximization of V y;js>0 with respect to  is given by:
@V y;js>0
@
= 0,  = yjs>0 
1=(2 + n)  (R=(2 + n))1= (wj= w(1 + n))
1=(2 + n) + (R=(2 + n))1= =R
(< 1):
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The preferred share  is increasing in  and is positive if and only if  > ~(wj).
Next, suppose that the type-j young agent is borrowing constrained. The rst-order
condition for the maximization of V y;js=0 with respect to  leads to:
@V y;js>0
@
= 0,  = yjs=0 
1=(2 + n)
1=(2 + n) + (=(2 + n))1=
(< 1):
We should note that yjs=0 is constant and independent of  . The equality holds between
yjs>0 and 
yj
s=0 at  = ^(w
j). Therefore, the preferred share  by a type-j young agent is
given as (14).
31
References
[1] Alesina, A., and Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 109, 465{490.
[2] Arawatari, R., and Ono, T., 2009. A second chance at success: a political economy
perspective. Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1249{1277.
[3] Benabou, R., 1996. Inequality and growth. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, B.
Bernanke and J. Rotemberg, eds., 11{74.
[4] Benabou, R., 2000. Unequal societies: income distribution and the social contract.
American Economic Review 90, 96{129.
[5] Benabou, R., and Ok, E.A., 2001. Social mobility and the demand for redistribution:
the POUM hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 447{487.
[6] Bethencourt, C., and Galasso, V., 2008. Political complements in the welfare state:
health care and social security. Journal of Public Economics 92, 609{632.
[7] Boldrin, M., and Rustichini, A., 2000. Political equilibria with social security. Review
of Economic Dynamics 3, 41{78.
[8] Borck, P., 2007. On the choice of public pensions when income and life expectancy
are correlated. Journal of Public Economic Theory 9, 711{725.
[9] Bellettini, G., and Berti Ceroni, C., 2007. Income distribution, borrowing constraints
and redistributive policies. European Economic Review 51, 625{645.
[10] Casamatta, G., Cremer, H., and Pestieau, P., 2000. The political economy of social
security. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102, 503{522.
[11] Chen, K., and Song, Z., 2009. Markovian social security in unequal societies.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1367476
[12] Conde-Ruiz, J.I., and Galasso, V., 2003. Early retirement. Review of Economic Dy-
namics 6, 12{36.
[13] Conde-Ruiz, J.I., and Galasso, V., 2005. Positive arithmetic of the welfare state.
Journal of Public Economics 89, 933{955.
[14] Conde-Ruiz, J.I., and Profeta, P., 2007. The redistributive design of social security
systems. Economic Journal 117, 686{712.
32
[15] Cooley, T.F., and Soares, J., 1999. A positive theory of social security based on
reputation. Journal of Political Economy 107, 135{160.
[16] Cremer, H., De Donder, P., Maldonado, D., Pestieau, P., 2007. Voting over type and
generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic. Journal of Public
Economics, 91, 2041{2061.
[17] Diamond, P., and Hausman, J.A., 1984. Individual retirement and savings behavior.
Journal of Public Economics 23, 81{114.
[18] Gottschalk, P., and Smeeding, T.M., 1997. Cross-national comparisons of earnings
and income inequality. Journal of Economic Literature 35, 633{687.
[19] Levy, G., 2005. The politics of public provision of education. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 120, 1507{1534.
[20] Meltzer, A., and Richard, S., 1981. A rational theory of the size of government.
Journal of Political Economy 89, 914{927.
[21] Persson, T., and Tabellini, G., 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth. American
Economic Review 84, 600{621.
[22] Pineda, J., and Rodriguez, F., 2006. The political economy of investment in human
capital. Economics of Governance 7, 167{193.
[23] Roberts, K.W.S., 1977. Voting over income tax schedules. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 8, 329{340.
[24] Rodriguez, F., 2004. Inequality, redistribution, and rent-seeking. Economics and Pol-
itics 16, 287{320.
[25] Romer, T., 1975. Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear
income tax. Journal of Public Economics 4, 163{185.
[26] Shepsle, K.A., 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional
voting models. American Journal of Political Science 23, 27{59.
33
Figure 1: This gure illustrates an example of the tax rates preferred by the old and the
young. In this example, a type-L young individual becomes a decisive voter.
34
Figure 2: The relation between savings and the tax rate for each type of individual.
35
Figure 3: Panel (a) illustrates the determination of  that maximizes the utility of the
borrowing-unconstrained young. Panel (b) illustrates the determination of  that max-
imizes the utility of the borrowing-constrained young. Panel (c) illustrates the share of
social security preferred by the young.
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Figure 4: The tax rates preferred by the three types of young individuals in the case of
1=  1.
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Figure 5: The gure illustrates the determination of the tax rate in the case of 1=  1.
Panel (a) is for the case of sL > 0 and  > 0. Panel (b) is for the case of sL = 0 and
 > 0.
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Figure 6: The tax rate preferred by a type-j young individual in the case of 1= < 1. The
bold curve illustrates the graph of ez in (11).
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Figure 7: The determination of the tax rate in the case of 1= < 1. The gure illustrates
the case where the decisive voter is a type-M young individual.
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Figure 8: The eect of a mean-preserving reduction of the decisive voter's wage on the tax
rate. Panel (a) illustrates the case of 1=  1. Panel (b) illustrates the case of 1= < 1.
Panel (c) illustrates the relation between the decisive voter's wage and the equilibrium
tax rate in the case of 1= < 1.
41
(Figure 9: Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the preferred tax rates in cases where 1=  1 and
1= < 1, respectively. Panel (c) illustrates the preferred shares of social security.
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